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NOTES

doctor, that we can summarily revoke the beer license while we must
leave the doctor to go on filling graveyards until notice and a complete
hearing have taken place. From the pecuniary aspect both licenses probably
represent a very substantial investment.
Where the usual method of solving a problem has been criticised as
unfair, it is in order to offer an alternative solution. In the matter of
licenses this does not seem to be too difficult. Actually nearly all kinds of
licenses require certain standards before granting, and an agency should
not refuse to grant, or revoke, any license so long as there is compliance
with these standards. Thus all that needs to be added is that with any
license the agency should actually have to find the non-compliance after
the licensee has been given notice and a chance to defend, rather than
refusing or revoking certain licenses on mere suspicion or hearsay and
without hearing or notice. Where there is a real danger, and summary
revocation would seem to be necessary, the use of an injunction could
solve the problem, thereby protecting the public in all things and not just
within certain categories. Little burden would be added either to agencies
or to courts. Even now agencies seldom revoke without some sort of fact
finding. Actually, more stringent due process requirements in granting
and revoking licenses would probably cut down the number of cases
coming into the courts.
DONALD L. YOUNG

ANOTHER LOOK AT THE MARTEL CASE
In the Martell case, an oil and gas lessee brought suit against a trespasser. Martel, the lessee, attempted to recover damages for the value of
the mineral interest for leasing purposes from the trespasser who drilled a
dry hole thereby rendering the lease valueless as a speculation. The
Wyoming court denied recovery on the ground that Martel's damages were
too speculative. Barquin, Martel's lessor, in an action arising out of the
same trespass, 2 recovered for surface damages and punitive damages. In
both of these cases, the court said that a right had been violated and the
parties so deprived could recover damages as shown. Plaintiff's counsel
in the Martel case brought to the court's attention the Kishi3 case in which
the Texas court allowed recovery under a similar situation. The Wyoming
court said that it was not disposed to follow the holding of the Kishi case.
Out of this background has grown a general belief that the holdings in
these two cases are in direct conflict 4 as to whether a mineral owner may

recover for the type of trespass involved in the Martel case. This note will
be concerned with a discussion as to whether these cases truly represent
conflicting views as to the rights of the injured party.
1.
2.
3.
4.

Martel v. Hall Oil Co., 36 Wyo. 166, 253 Pac. 862 (1927).
Hall Oil Co. v. Barquin, 33 Wyo. 92, 237 Pac. 255 (1927).
Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Kishi (Tex. Comm. App.), 276 S.W. 190 (1925).
1 Wyo. L.J. 123 (1946).
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Consideration shall first be given to the distinguishing facts of the
Martel and Kishi cases. In the Wyoming Martel case, there were no sales
of any oil rights in the immediate area and the lease in question was two
miles from the nearest producing well. In the Texas Kishi case, there was
testimony from several witnesses that a lease, such as Kishi's, could have
been made for bonuses ranging from $750 to $2,500 an acre. It is true
that Kishi did not show that he was actually offered a lease, but the Texas
court in its findings of fact said that it would seem probable, in view of
all the evidence, that purchasers could have been found to speculate on
the probability of oil being found in this tract, who would have paid, during
the period of uncertainty as to its productiveness, at the rate of $1,000
per acre for the customary lease of the fifty acres, and that it had such a
market value during that time, and it was so determined. Kishi's fifty
acres adjoined a small tract on which a producing well, about 150 feet
distant, was located. It was the bringing in of this well that rendered
Kishi's land valuable as a possible productive territory. Thus, we see that
there are at least two important factual differences between these two cases:
(1) In all probability Kishi could have leased for $1,000 an acre, while
Martel could not even show there was any interest in his lease; (2) there
was a producing well in close proximity to Kishi's land, while the closest
producer was two miles distant from Martel's lease.
It is submitted that because of the difficulty, if not impossibility, of
showing damages in the Martel case, the Texas court, in a similar factual
situation, might well have arrived at the same holding as did the Wyoming
court. If, for the sake of argument, it is granted that this conclusion is
valid, the question arises as to whether the inverse would be true, that is,
would there be recovery in Wyoming under facts similar to the Kishi case.
The Wyoming court, in the Martel case, states that the Hall Oil Company
interfered with Martel's exclusive right to explore the land in question
and to drill for oil and gas thereon and remove it therefrom, if found, and,
if the latter sustained any damage by reason thereof, he is entitled to recover
it. However, the court then held that whatever value Martel's rights had
were purely speculative, and that such speculative value did not furnish any
basis for damages. This suggests that it is merely a problem of showing
damages for the holder of the mineral interest to recover from such a trespasser. In assessing damages, the market value is the usual standard, and
merely because the market value is difficult to determine is no basis for
assessing only nominal damages.
Dean Leon Green, in an article 5 criticizing the holding of the Kishi
case, and Summers6 both agree that the rights of the owner of oil and gas
interests have been violated where there has been such a trespass, but say
that damages are too speculative and under no present theory of tort law
may damages be awarded for such a loss. They, as well as the Wyoming
5
6.

4 Tex. L. Rev. 215.
Summers, Oil and Gas, Vol 1, § 25.

NOTEs
court in the Martel case, state that there is enough of a deterrent, in that
the trespasser will lose all production and perhaps costs of production and
exploration, if the property yields a producing well. This concept would
seem to require a re-examination. It may well be a general rule that wells
will not be drilled if the lease is in question, although both the Martel and
Kishi cases limit this general proposition. In both of those cases, the subsequently determined trespassers had actual notice that their right to drill
was being strongly questioned and that litigation was pending.
In contrast to Green and Summers, McCormick 7 advocates the awarding of damages in such situations. He recognizes that one common motive
actuating purchasers is the desire of holding the property for speculation
on'the hazard of a rise in value. McCormick further says that this speculative attractiveness, though occasionally frowned upon, as in the Martel
case, seems properly recognized as a factor to be considered in determining
market value, that is, the amount that a purchaser could have been induced to pay. He then sets out a broad policy for determining value by
saying that if a high price for the property actually could have been
secured at the time in question, this should be accounted its then market
value, however sudden this rise may have been or however much of it may
have been due to baseless rumors or to illegal pools or combinations, unless
it appears that the person claiming compensation has himself unlawfully
participated in artificial market operations which swelled the price, in
which event he might well be limited, as a matter of policy, to a more
normal and usual price.
It is submitted that McCormick's view is the more realistic and
recognizes that an intangible, such as a speculation, has value. There are
many persons engaged in the buying and selling of oil and gas leases solely
for speculative purposes. They form an important part of our economy
and perform a valuable function in the oil industry. To say that we
recognize that they have a valuable right, but, if that right is violated, they
can recover only nominal damages, because all other damage is too uncertain, is actually to ignore the right itself. An examination of cases in
which recovery has been allowed reveals that market value of an unproved
lease has been determined in many ways. The following cases illustrate some
of the methods used: (1) Landowner was allowed to recover $5.00 an acre
where the Defendant trespassed and made geophysical explorations, and it
was shown that the Defendant itself paid $5.00 an acre for the privilege of
shooting certain acreage within its own lease block.8 (2) Recovery of
$10.00 an acre was allowed where the Defendant trespasser made a geophysical test, and the landowner introduced evidence that the Defendant
had paid $10.00 an acre for a lease on similar land one-half mile from
Plaintiff's land. 9 (3) The owners were allowed a recovery of $4,000 from
7.
8.
9.

McCormick, Handbook on the Law of Damages, West (1935).
Layne La. Co. v. Superior Oil Co., 209 La. 1014, 26 So.2d 20 (1946).
Angelloz v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 196 La. 604, 199 So. 656 (1940).
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the Defendant trespasser, who drilled a dry hole, where it was shown that
the trespasser had paid the holder of a void lease, on the land in question,
$4,000 for the assignment thereof.10 (4) Where the Defendant holder of
a void lease on eighty acres refused to release the same, and the Plaintiff
mineral owner could show that he had an opportunity to lease for a substantial sum and could have done so but for the Defendant's conduct an
award of $24,000 was granted." (5) The Plaintiff landower recovered
against the holder of a lease that had expired, where such holder refused
to release the expired lease, and there was evidence of an expert as to the
market value of such lease, even though no leases were taken in the field
during that period. 12 In the foregoing cited cases, it is to be noted that
damages were awarded for the interference of the Defendant with the
exclusive rights of the mineral owner or lessee in situations in which the
actual presence of oil and gas had not been previously determined. The
courts clearly had no difficulty in assessing damages based upon realistic
appraisal of the market value of the exclusive opportunity to ascertain the
absence or presence of oil and gas.
In reconsidering the Martel case of 1927, cognizance must be taken
of current practices and developments in the oil industry. If a typical oil
and gas lease of today is examined, it will be observed that there are two
main valuable rights contained therein. The lessee receives, first, the
mineral owner's exclusive right to explore for oil and gas, and second, the
right to retain a percent of oil and gas discovered and produced. Since
the lessee has this exclusive right, all exploration, during the term of the
lease, must be under his consent. This exclusive right of exploration, in
many cases, is as important a consideration for entering into the lease as is
the percent of production to be retained. Many leases are taken by persons
who are not themselves engaged in the exploration and production of oil
and gas. While it is true that they may retain an override and assign
the lease to someone who will develop the acreage, their bargaining power
lies in their exclusive right of exploration. If the rule in the Martel case
is so broad as to preclude damages for the interference with exclusive
exploratory rights, the lessee could not even recover from a trespasser in
bad faith who made geophysical explorations on the acreage that the lessee
had under lease. This would then mean that anyone who is desirous of
obtaining geological information would not even have to determine the
mineral ownership of land, but merely make what exploration he desired
in derogation of recognized rights. The information thus received may
be worth many thousands of dollars, and would have cost something had
the right to make such examination been purchased from the rightful
owner. Since the 1927 decision in the Martel ease, great strides have been
made in the development of scientific methods of exploration. Valuable
information is gained from such exploration and justifies the tremendous
10.
11.
12.

Matheson v. Placid Oil Co., 212 La. 807, 33 So2d 527 (1947). *
American Surety Co. of N.Y. v. Marsh, 146 Okla. 261, 293 Pac. 1041 (1930).
Soleberg v. Sunburst Oil & Gas Co., 76 Mont. 254, 246 Pac. 168 (1926).
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amounts of money spent thereon. Thus, the exclusive right to explore is
recognized as a valuable right, and one to be bargained for, bought and
sold as any tangible.
It would seem harsh to say that in Wyoming only nominal damages
can be recovered today for a trespass, as in the Martel case, regardless of
the proof of damages. It is submitted that it is merely a matter of degree
in evidence as to whether damages are too speculative to allow recovery,
and that the Martel case, in recognizing the invasion of a right, would
allow damages upon sufficient proof. Thus, where it can be shown that
the mineral owner had a valid offer that was withdrawn because of the
trespasser's acts, the damages are not speculative. Present practices should
also cause recognition of established market values where leases are being
bought and sold in the area, and it appears reasonable that the lease could
have been sold for a certain amount, so that value is definite enough to
take the damages out of the speculative category. Where the holder of the
mineral title cannot show that he had an offer or even that it might reasonably be concluded that he could have leased for a determined amount, his
damages are speculative and recovery will be denied.
LEONARD McEWAN

VALUATION OF A WIDOW'S LIFE ESTATE
FOR ELECTION PURPOSES
It frequently happens that it is necessary to calculate the value of
a life estate. It is difficult, if not impossible, to make an exact calculation,
thus parties seeking such a determination must be satisfied with a just or
equitable result. The problem arises in such situations as the partition of
2
property' and the determination of value for inheritance tax purposes.
However, the present concern is with the method of determining the
value of a widow's life estate, for purposes of determining whether the
widow may elect to take her statutory share against the husband's will
3
under Wyoming's forced heir statute.
In past history, various methods for determining the value of life
estates have been relied upon. Possibly, the most simple is the agreement
of the parties in interest,4 such as the life tenant and the remainderman.
This would be an acceptable solution at the present time, but it is seldom
that the parties are so agreeable. In England, a rule was established that
5
the value of a life estate should be a one-third share of the net estate.
This was known as the Equitable or the Common-law rule. This rule has
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

South Carolina Savings Bank v. Stansell, 160 S.C. 81, 158 S.E. 131 (1931).
In re Leonard's Estate, 199 Misc. 138, 100 NY. Supp.2d 105 (1950).
Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 6-301 (1945).
United States v. 15,883.55 Acres of Land in Spartanburg County, South Carolina,
45 F. Supp. 783 (1942).
Keniston v. Gorrell, 74 N.H. 53, 64 At. 1101 (1906).

